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CALIFORNIA'S REGULATION OF NON-CONSENSUAL PRIVATE
PROPERTY Tows: WHY SECTION 22658(l)
IS FEDERALLY PREEMPTED
Imagine an apartment in a crowded, urban area. It is dark and
very late at night. A tenant arrives at home and finds an illegally
parked vehicle in her assigned parking space. There are no other
available parking spaces. It takes her fifteen minutes of driving
around in circles to find the only street parking in the area, blocks
away, forcing her to walk to her apartment alone in the dark. When
she finally gets home she calls the manager.
In response, the manager calls a tow truck and then heads out to
the dark parking lot to wait. It is against the law for her to simply call
to have the trespasser towed, nor can she proactively arrange for en-
forcement of the lot's legally posted rules.' Instead, she must be on
the scene throughout the tow procedure and provide the tow operator
with specific, written authorization every time this occurs.2 So the
manager waits alone in the dark, recalling the numerous death and
bomb threats she has already received as a result of the property's
well-known authorization policy. She waits, wondering what type of
person she may encounter if the trespasser comes out to try and re-
trieve his vehicle.
This is the law promulgated in California Vehicle Code section
22658(l).4 The California Legislature insists that this law promotes
"safety."5 The Legislature claims that having a manager or property
1. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 22658 (West 2004).
2. Id. § 22658(/)(1).
3. Opening Brief of the Appellee, Addendum at 62-67, Tillison v. City of San Diego,
Nos. 03-55939, 03-56188, 2004 WL 546060 (9th Cir. Feb. 6, 2004); Telephone Interview
with John Tillison, Owner, West Coast Towing (May 17, 2004) [hereinafter Tillson Interview
I]. Mr. Tillison relayed several stories where property owners and managers were threatened
with retribution for authorizing the towing of a specific vehicle. Id. One apartment manager
at Pacific Gardens in San Diego even received bomb and death threats for giving specific au-
thorization for tows. Id. Mr. Tillison asserted that his company was better equipped and
more accustomed to deal with these dangers. Id. He asserted that most property owners and
managers prefer to have his company enforce their parking regulations instead of having to
deal with the dangers themselves. Id. See Brief of Amicus Curiae North County Apartment
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owner on the scene increases safety because it can lessen confronta-
tions and tow mistakes.6 However, California Vehicle Code section
22658(l) is not a safety regulation. It fails to meet the criteria of both
the California and the United State Supreme Court as a legitimate
safety regulation.7 In reality, this law contravenes safety. It does not
promote the safety of the tenant who has to walk alone in the dark to
her apartment because assigned spaces and parking rules cannot be en-
forced. It does not protect the safety of the manager who must be on
the scene and provide written authorization every time a trespasser
ought to be towed. In fact, the only person who is protected is the
very person causing the potentially dangerous situation to arise. It is
"hard to believe that [the Legislature] would put the safety of the 'law
breaker' before the safety of [others],"8 but this is the result of Cali-
fornia Vehicle Code section 22658(1).
Additionally, section 22658(l) prevents tow companies from
freely conducting legal business transactions by prohibiting general-
ized contracts with private property owners to enforce property regu-
lations.9 In particular, a state statute that exerts "acute, albeit indirect,
economic effects" may unreasonably burden interstate commerce and
be subject to federal preemption.' 0 The California courts have yet to
examine the economic implications of section 22658(l), but a statisti-
cal analysis of the towing industry and California's impact on the
United States economy reveals that section 22658(1) may be a regula-
tion with such a burden. "
This Comment will demonstrate that despite the Legislature's
statement of intent to "further the safety of the general public,"' 2 Cali-
fornia's prohibition of generalized contracts between tow companies
and private property owners fails as a safety regulation and unrea-
sonably burdens interstate commerce. Therefore, California Vehicle
Code section 22658(l) is preempted by section 14501(c) of the Federal
6. See Hearing A.B. 792 Before the Senate Transportation Comm, Sen. Reg. Sess. (Cal.
July 22, 2003) [hereinafter Senate].
7. See infra Part IV.A.
8. Senate, supra note 6.
9. Telephone Interview with John Tillison, Owner, West Coast Towing (Feb. 4, 2004)
[hereinafter Tillison Interview 1I].
10. See N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
514 U.S. 645, 668 (1995) (holding that New York's surcharges only indirectly affect insur-
ance policy prices and were not intended to be preempted under the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act).
11. See infra Part IV.B.
12. CAL. VEH. CODE § 22658(m)(2) (West 2004).
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Aviation Administration Authorization Act, 13 which effectively de-
regulated the towing industry.14 The resolution of this issue is essen-
tial to the freedom of tow truck companies and private property own-
ers to conduct business with one another, 15 and is significant in
defining the regulatory role of the state.
6
Part I of this Comment will define the conflicting California and
federal laws. Part II will describe the rules that determine preemption
analysis. Part III will review the current California cases, their incon-
sistent interpretations, and cases pending decision. Part IV will assert
that the California statute is not a genuine safety regulation and is an
unreasonable economic burden. Part V will conclude with predictions
regarding pending cases as well as the fate of California's law.
I. THE CONFLICTING LAWS
A. The Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act
Section 14501(c)
The Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (FAAA)
section 14501(c) provides that a State may not "enact or enforce a
law, regulation, or other provision" affecting the "price, route, or ser-
vice of any motor carrier... with respect to the transportation of [pri-
vate] property."' 7 Towing companies and towers qualify as "person[s]
providing motor vehicle transportation for compensation, ' ' "8 and fall
within the statute's scope. 9
In City of Columbus v. Ours Garage and Wrecker Service, Inc.,2"
the Supreme Court asserted that the purpose of section 14501(c) was
to deregulate the "intrastate transportation of property by the
States."'" The Court asserted Congress' findings that deregulation is
13. See Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAA) § 14501(c),
49 U.S.C. 14501(c) (1995)). The FAAA was amended by the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion Termination Act of 1995, which added section 14501. Pub. L. No. 104-88, 109 Stat.
803. See discussion of preemption infra Part ff. See generally Wayne F. Foster, Annotation,
Validity and Construction of Statute or Ordinance Regulating Vehicle Towing Business, 97
A.L.R.3d 495 (1980).
14. See 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c) (2000).
15. Tillison Interview 1, supra note 9.
16. Id. See also Tillison Interview I, supra note 3.
17. § 14501(c)(1).
18. 49 U.S.C. § 13102(12) (2000).
19. City of Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Serv., Inc., 536 U.S. 424, 430 (2002).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 440 (quoting FAAA § 601(a)(1), Pub. L. No. 103-305, 108 Stat. 1569 (1994))
(emphasis added). The Court quoted the deregulatory purposes of section 14501(c) in deter-
3
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necessary because "[s]tate economic regulation of motor carrier opera-
tions ... is a huge problem for national and regional carriers attempt-
ing to conduct a standard way of doing business."22 In fact, Congress
found that "the State regulatory process should be preempted"2 3 re-
garding "the regulation of intrastate transportation of property"'24 be-
cause such regulation "imposed an unreasonable burden on interstate
commerce"25 and "impeded the free flow of [business]."26
Although the FAAA deregulates a significant amount of the tow-
ing industry, the statute maintains and preserves several areas of state
regulation. These areas include regulations concerning safety, 27 "the
transportation of household goods,' 28 the price for non-consensual
toWS,29 and "uniform cargo liability rules. '30 If a state law falls within
one of these preserved realms, it garners exception from preemption
under the FAAA.31
B. California Vehicle Code Sections 22658(l) and (m)(2)
In contrast to the deregulatory purpose of the FAAA, California
Vehicle Code section 22658(l) specifies strict procedures for non-
consensual tows from private property,32 which impede businesses
from freely making legal contracts.33 Section 22658(l)(1), enacted in
1991,34 states that if a towing company is to "remove or commence the
mining whether a state's power to regulate safety over tow-truck operations could be dele-
gated to local municipalities. Id. at 428. The court held that the safety exception did extend
to the regulatory authority of local municipalities, but left the issue of whether the regulation
was safety related open on remand. Id. at 442.
22. Id. at 440 (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 103-677, at 87 (1994)).
23. FAAA § 601(a)(2).
24. Id. § 601(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
25. Id.
26. Id. § 601(a)(1)(B). Congress found that regulation "impeded the free flow of trade,
traffic, and transportation of interstate commerce." Id.
27. 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(A).
28. Id. § 14501(c)(2)(B).
29. Id. § 14501(c)(2)(C).
30. Id. § 14501(c)(3)(A).
31. City of Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Serv. Inc., 536 U.S. 422, 429 (2002).
32. CAL. VEH. CODE § 22658(l) (West 2004).
33. Interview with Todd J. Hilts, Attorney at Law, Law Office of Todd J. Hilts, in
San Diego, Cal. (Feb. 12, 2004). Mr. Hilts is counsel for Tillison, d/b/a West Coast Towing,
which is currently challenging section 22658(l). Tillison v. City of San Diego, Nos. 03-
55939, 03-56188, 2004 WL 546060 (9th Cir. Feb. 6, 2004). Mr. Hilts is also counsel for Til-
lison, d/b/a West Coast Towing, in a case against the State of Washington. Tillison v. Locke,
DC No. V03-5514 FDB (W.D. Wash. 2004), appeal docketed, No. 04-35539 (9th Cir. July 8,
2004).
34. Act of Oct. 14, 1991, S.B. No. 887, § 22658()(1), 1991 Cal. Legis. Serv. 1004
4
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removal of a vehicle from private property," the tower must "first ob-
tain[] written authorization from the property owner" or agent, who
must "be present at the time of removal." 35  Furthermore, the
"[g]eneral authorization to remove.., a vehicle ... shall not be dele-
gated to a towing company. ' 36 Failure to comply with this section im-
poses liability on the tow company "for four times the amount of the
towing and storage charges" plus any additional criminal penalties.
3 7
Thus, this provision prevents tow companies from contracting with
private property owners to regularly enforce property rights and regu-
lations.38
On February 20, 2003, eight months after the United States Su-
preme Court forewarned that towing regulations "not genuinely re-
sponsive to safety concerns" would be preempted under the FAAA,39
California Vehicle Code section 22658(m)(2) was introduced. 4° Sec-
tion 22658(m)(2) states that "[i]t is the intent of the Legislature in the
adoption of ... [22658](1) to further the safety of the general public by
ensuring ... authorization for the removal of a vehicle" from private
property.4 The lead argument in support of the new statute was to
"assist the courts in any subsequent litigation" and to "enhance the po-
sition and legal standing of the State of California. ' 42 In general, sec-
tion 22658(m)(2) was enacted based on the state's desire to avoid pre-
emption under the FAAA and evidence that section 22658(l)
genuinely advanced public safety was non-existent.43
(West).
35. CAL. VEH. CODE § 22658(1)(1).
36. Id. Within the Ninth Circuit, only the state of Washington has a similar statute pro-
hibiting generalized contracts for private property tows. WASH. REV. CODE § 46.44.080(2)
(2001). This statute is currently being challenged as preempted by the FAAA in the case of
Locke, DC No. V03-5514 FDB. Contrary to California and Washington, the state of Arizona
expressly permits the formation of these contracts to enforce parking regulations on private
property. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 9-499.05 (2001).
37. CAL. VEH. CODE § 22658(l)(3).
38. Interview with Todd J. Hilts, supra note 33.
39. City of Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Serv. Inc., 536 U.S. 424, 442 (2002)
(emphasis added).
40. A.B. 792, Assem. Reg. Sess. (Cal. Feb. 20, 2003) [hereinafter Assembly].
41. § 22658(m)(2).
42. Senate, supra note 6.
43. See id. An early argument in favor of section 22658(m)(2) stated that written au-
thorization for each tow was important because if tow operators were allowed to make such
decisions without consulting the property owner, the number of improper tows might increase
and lead to violent situations. Assembly, supra note 40. See infra Part W.A.
5
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C. The Conflict
FAAA section 14501(c) deregulates the towing industry to allevi-
ate economic burdens while preserving the safety regulatory realm for
the states.44 In contrast, California Vehicle Code section 22658(l) re-
stricts services on non-consensual private property tows. 45 This re-
striction is asserted by the Legislature to properly fall within the
state's power to regulate safety. 6 However, as will be discussed, a
proper analysis of section 22658(l) reveals it is not genuinely con-
cerned with safety and it unreasonably burdens commerce, subjecting
it to preemption by the FAAA.47
II. PREEMPTION ANALYSIS
The laws of the United States "shall be the supreme Law of the
Land, ' 48 and if any state law interferes with federal law, the state law
must yield.49 However, preemption analysis begins with the assump-
tion that "the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be super-
seded . . .unless that [is] the clear and manifest purpose of Con-
gress."5  Such purpose may be express in the statute or implied.51
Implied preemption exists where the federal law "thoroughly occupies
a legislative field" making it reasonable to infer that "Congress left no
room for the States to supplement it."52 Preemption may also be im-
plied where the state law is found to be in actual conflict with the fed-
eral law.53 Thus, state law is federally preempted where the statute
44. Ours Garage, 536 U.S. at 439-40.
45. § 22658(/); see also Tillison Interview II, supra note 9.
46. § 22658(m)(2); see Senate, supra note 6.
47. See infra Part IV.
48. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
49. Gibons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (ruling that New York's granting of a
monopoly of ferry rights between New York and New Jersey was invalid because it interfered
with the federal interstate commerce power).
50. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (holding that the Federal
Cigarette Labeling Act of 1965 and 1969 did not preempt many state law claims but did pre-
empt claims based on a failure to warn where there was reliance on information from adver-
tising) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
51. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1978). Examination of the implied
purposes of a federal law requires more then a superficial reading of the statute and includes
additional research. Id.
52. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516 (quoting Rice, 331 U.S. at 230).
53. Id. (quoting Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation and Dev.
Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 204, (1983)); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 427
(1819) (holding that it is constitutional for the U.S. to create a bank under Congress' broad
powers and it is unconstitutional for states to impose taxes on the bank because of their lim-
[Vol. 41
6
California Western Law Review, Vol. 41 [2004], No. 1, Art. 7
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol41/iss1/7
2004] CAL.'S REGULATION OF NON-CONSENSUAL PRIVATE PROPERTY Tows 309
and Congress' purpose explicitly dictates preemption or where such
purpose is fairly implied.
Regarding non-consensual private property tows, the express lan-
guage of the FAAA, and Congress' purpose, determines the question
of preemption. As previously discussed, the express language of
FAAA section 14501(c) preempts state laws regulating tow trucks that
relate to routes or services 54 while preserving the states' authority to
regulate safety.5 The FAAA also provides that the Secretary of
Transportation may render a state law unenforceable and preempted if
the state law has no safety benefit or where "enforcement of the State
law . . . would cause an unreasonable burden on interstate com-
merce."56 In addition, Congress' purpose was that "the State regula-
tory process should be preempted" 57 because such regulation "im-
posed an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce"58 and
"impeded the free flow of [business]."5 9
In Ours Garage, the Supreme Court affirmed the express lan-
guage of the FAAA and Congress' purpose to preempt "States' eco-
nomic authority over motor carriers of property... [but] 'not restrict'
the preexisting and traditional state police power over safety." 6 The
Court also warned that a state law "not genuinely responsive to safety
concerns" would be preempted by the FAAA.61 Similarly, the Court
reinforced the role of the Secretary of Transportation as a safeguard to
protect Congress' deregulatory purpose.62  The Court stated that the
Secretary is authorized to "void any 'State law or regulation' . . . that,
in the Secretary's judgment, 'has no safety benefit . . . [or] would
cause an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce.'
' 63
To conclude, the express language of the FAAA, the purposes of
Congress, and the Court's affirmation all assert that state regulations
ited authority to impede the federal government).
54. 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1) (2004). Although the price of a private property motor car-
rier is deregulated under (c)(l), price is one area reserved for regulation by the states in re-
gards to non-consensual towing. Id. § 14501(c)(2)(C).
55. Id. § 14501 (c)(2)(A). In addition to safety, there are three other areas reserved for
the states, including transportation of household goods, price for non-consensual tow services,
and rules that affect liability. Id. §§ 14501(c)(2)(A)-(C), (c)(3)(A).
56. 49 U.S.C. § 31141(c)(4)(C) (2000).
57. FAAA, § 601(a)(2), Pub. L. No. 103-305, 108 Stat. 1569 (1994).
58. Id. § 601 (a)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
59. Id. § 601(a)(1)(B). Congress found that regulation "impeded the free flow of trade,
traffic, and transportation of interstate commerce." Id.
60. City of Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Serv. Inc., 536 U.S. 424, 439 (2002).
61. Id. at 442 (emphasis added).
62. Id. at 441-42; 49 U.S.C. §§ 31141(a), (c)(4).
63. Ours Garage, 536 U.S. at 441.
7
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genuinely concerned with safety and not an unreasonable burden on
commerce will be saved from preemption. Thus, whether California
Vehicle Code section 22658(l) is preempted by the FAAA hinges on
an analysis of its affect on safety and the economy.
III. THE CALIFORNIA CASES
A. Tocher v. City of Santa Anal
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals determined in Tocher that
California Vehicle Code section 22658(l) was federally preempted by
the FAAA. 65 Tocher, the operator of a tow company in Santa Ana,
California, brought suit against the City to enjoin enforcement of sev-
eral local ordinances and state laws, including California Vehicle
Code section 22658().66 The district court ruled in Tocher's favor,
concluding that the laws were federally preempted and enjoined their
enforcement. 67 The City appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals.68 In examining the regulations de novo, the court affirmed that
section 22658(l) was "preempted because [it is] based on consumer
protection rather than safety."69 Unfortunately, the court did not pro-
vide any further explanation or rationale.
B. People v. Servantes °
In contrast to Tocher, the First District Court of Appeal of Cali-
fornia drastically departed from the Ninth Circuit's rationale in Ser-
vantes and held that California Vehicle Code section 22658(l) was ex-
empt from federal preemption as a safety regulation. 7' The City
Attorney of San Francisco brought suit against Servantes seeking
"permanent injunction, civil penalties, and disgorgement of profits."72
The trial court held "that Servantes had committed hundreds of viola-
64. Tocher v. City of Santa Ana, 219 F.3d 1040 (9th Cir. 1999) (abrogated in part as to
whether the safety regulation exemption extended to municipalities in Ours Garage, 536 U.S.
at 424).
65. Id. at 1051.
66. Id. at 1043-44.
67. Id. at 1044.
68. Id. at 1043.
69. Id. at 1051.
70. People v. Servantes, 86 Cal. App. 4th 1081 (2001).
71. Id. at 1090-92.
72. Id. at 1083.
310 [Vol. 41
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tions,"73 and ordered him to pay $74,700 in civil penalties, to forfeit
$52,500 in illegal profits as restitution to his victims, and to pay
$87,000 for 174 violates of a preliminary injunction.74 In addition, the
court "permanently enjoined Servantes from towing vehicles on pri-
vate property within the State of California. ' 75 Servantes did not dis-
pute many of the charges; instead, his primary defense was that the
regulations were preempted by federal law and therefore unenforce-
able. 6 The trial court rejected this argument, and the appeals court af-
firmed on all counts.77
More concerned with the desire to impose punishment and less
with the law, the Court of Appeals described in detail Servantes' work
ethic as a tow truck operator.78 The court described how, within one
year of opening his company, Servantes' permit was revoked and
never reinstated, yet he continued to tow vehicles for many years.
79
The court also described how Servantes regularly overcharged fees,
stashed vehicles,80 conducted business with false identification, and
was cited by the police for operating without a permit or a driver's li-
cense. 81 Given these violations, it is clear that Servantes put the safety
of vehicle owners, their property, and the general public at risk.82
In a lengthy opinion reviewing the challenged regulations, the
court addressed the violations of California Vehicle Code section
22658() only once and stated that "[b]y ensuring that removal occurs
only upon proper authorization, the statute obviou sly serves to protect
vehicle owners and the public at large from both towing mistakes and
outright theft of vehicles. 'a3  In asserting this view, the court con-
cluded that section 22658(l) "offers far more than economic protection
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1084.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1087.
77. Id. at 1087-95.
78. Id. at 1085-87.
79. Id.
80. "Stashing" vehicles is an illegal process where tow operators tow and "stash" vehi-
cles on public streets nearby, but in a location where the vehicle owner cannot find it. Later
the tow truck operator will return to where the vehicle is stashed and tow it to the garage.
This process gives the tow truck operator the opportunity to tow more vehicles before owners
return. Interview with Todd J. Hilts, Attorney at Law, Law Office of Todd J. Hilts, in
San Diego, Cal. (Feb. 16, 2004) [hereinafter Interview with Hilts].
81. Servantes, 86 Cal. App. 4th at 1085-86.
82. Id. at 1091. The court recounts the testimony of William Griffith who, because of
Servantes' illegal practices, feared for his safety. Id.
83. Id. at 1090 (emphasis added).
9
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to the consumer" and declined to follow the Ninth Circuit's determi-
nation that the statute was federally preempted. 84
The court of appeals was clearly upset by both Servantes' actions
and the argument that such actions were excusable under federal pre-
emption. In an effort to punish a person who preyed upon vehicle
owners, the court asserted that California Vehicle section 22658(l)
was safety related and that it was not consumer protectionist. 85 How-
ever, the court offered scant support for this conclusion and ignored
the purposes of section 22658(l).86 The statute "does not merely re-
quire removal 'upon proper authorization"' to prevent tow mistakes,
"[i]t requires specific, written authorization for each and every tow, as
well as the physical presence of the owner. '87 The court did not ex-
plain how such a regulation served public safety.88
It should also be noted that the court began its opinion by quoting
Justice Harold G. Clarke saying that "[t]he law gives the towing com-
pany a great advantage over the owner of the towed car, and creates a
great potential for unfair business practices. ' 89 Certainly, this supports
the view upheld in Tocher that section 22658(l) is not a safety regula-
tion but a consumer protectionist statute.90
C. Tillison v. City of San Diego9'
Contrary to California Vehicle Code section 22658(l), Tillison,
owner of West Coast Towing (WCT), maintains several contracts
whereby property owners give blanket authorization to remove ille-
gally parked vehicles. 92 WCT regularly patrols these parking lots, and
enforces parking restrictions by performing non-consensual tows
without specific authorization. 93 On December 21, 2001, while per-
forming such a tow, Gregory Clark, a WCT employee, was stopped by
a San Diego Police officer and found to be in violation of section
84. Id. The court expressly disagreed with the Ninth Circuit ruling in Tocher which de-
clared 22658() a consumer protectionist statute. Tocher, 219 F.3d 1040.
85. Servantes, 86 Cal. App. 4th at 1090.
86. Excerpts of Record, Decision at 7-8, Tillison v. City of San Diego, DC No. CV-01-
02373-RMB (LSP) (S.D. Cal. 2003), appeal docketed, No. 03-55939 (9th Cir. Jan. 19, 2004).
87. Id. at 8.
88. Id.
89. Servantes, 86 Cal. App. 4th at 1083.
90. Tocher, 219 F.3d at 1051.
91. Tillison, 2004 WL 546060.
92. Excerpts of Record, Decision at 1, Tillison v. City of San Diego, DC No. CV-01-
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22658(l).14  Clark was ordered to return the towed vehicle but re-
fused.95 Upon refusal, Clark was arrested "for violation of California
Penal Code section 148 (restricting, delaying, or obstructing a police
officer in the performance of his duties)," and "[t]he tow truck was
seized as evidence. 96 In response, Tillison brought suit for damages
and to enjoin further enforcement of section 22658(l) arguing that the
statute was preempted by the FAAA.97
Applying the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Tocher,
the United States District Court for the Southern District of California
granted Tillison's motion for a temporary restraining order to enjoin
the City of San Diego from enforcing California Vehicle Code section
22658(l). 8 After trial and a lengthy analysis of section 22658(l), the
court held it was "not a statute that significantly addresse[d] public
safety concerns" or an "exercise of 'the safety regulatory authority of
a state.' 99
The court followed Tocher, and found that "[s]ection 22658(l)(1)
is an economic regulation" and that if it "protects anyone, it protects
trespassers, not the general public.""U°° The court disagreed with Ser-
vantes that section 22658(l) helps to prevent "outright theft of vehi-
cles' ' and stated that it was "at a loss as to how a written permission
requirement makes [this] less likely to occur" as it was "unaware of
any thief who ha[d] ever asked for permission, written or otherwise,
before stealing a car.' ' °2
Therefore, the court found that section 22658(l) was preempted by
the FAAA and ordered that the City "be permanently enjoined from
enforcing California Vehicle Code section 22658 (1)."103 The case is
pending appeal to the Ninth Circuit. 1°4
94. Excerpts of Record, Decision at 2, Tillison (No. 03-55939).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. Tillison also challenged and sought to enjoin enforcement of California Vehicle
Code sections 22651.1, 22658(a), (k). Id. For the purposes of this Comment, only section
22658(t) is discussed.
98. Id.
99. Excerpts of Record, Decision at 12, Tillison (No. 03-55939) (quoting 49 U.S.C.
§ 14501(c)(2)(A)).
100. Id.
101. People v. Servantes, 86 Cal. App. 4th 1081, 1090 (2001).
102. Excerpts of Record, Decision at 8, n.3, Tillison (No. 03-55939).
103. Excerpts of Record, Decision at 12, Tillison (No. 03-55939).
104. Tillison v. City of San Diego, Nos. 03-55939, 03-56188, 2004 WL 546060 (9th Cir.
Feb. 6, 2004) (Oral argument was heard on November 4, 2004). A decision will undoubtedly
affect both the resolution of whether federal law preempts section 22658(1) and an identical
Washington State statute also currently being challenged. Interview with Todd J. Hilts, At-
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D. Can the Cases be Reconciled?
As illustrated above, California is conflicted as to whether Vehicle
Code section 22658(l) is exempt from federal preemption by the
FAAA. In summary, "the Ninth Circuit has declared that [s]ection
22658(l)(1) is not a safety regulation without explaining why not, and
the state appellate court has declared that [s]ection 22658(l)(1) is a
safety regulation without explaining why."'"" A simple explanation of
the discrepancy between the cases is that the court in Servantes was
dealing with a criminal defendant and not business owners conducting
legitimate business practices as in Tocher and Tillison. This undoubt-
edly influenced the Servantes court and its decision.
However, it is important to note that these cases were determined
prior to the enactment of California Vehicle Code section
22658(m)(2) which asserts the Legislature's intent of 22658(1) is to
promote public safety." 6 It is not clear how this new statute will in-
fluence the court. Additionally, only Tillison was decided in the wake
of Ours Garage and the forewarning that a state regulatory law "not
genuinely responsive to safety concerns" would not be exempt from
federal preemption. 07 Perhaps this narrowing of the safety exemption
will ultimately lead the court to follow Tillison and determine that
22658(l) is not a genuine safety regulation giving it an exempt status
from preemption under the FAAA.
Furthermore, the cases have only examined California Vehicle
Code section 22658(l) as to its status as a safety regulation. But the
preemption issue turns on whether a statute is a safety regulation or
whether it is an unreasonable economic burden."0 8 The analysis of
whether section 22658(l) is an economic burden has yet to be ad-
dressed by the courts° 9
torney at Law, Law Office of Todd J. Hilts, in San Diego, Cal. (Sept. 28, 2004). See also Til-
lison v. Locke, DC No.V03-5514 FDB (W.D. Wash. 2004), appeal docketed, No. 04-35539
(9th Cir. July 8, 2004).
105. Excerpts of Record, Decision at 8, Tillison (No. 03-55939).
106. See Tocher v. City of Santa Ana, 219 F.3d 1040 (1999); Servantes, 86 Cal. App. 4th
at 1091; Tillison, 2004 WL 546060; Assembly, supra note 40.
107. Ours Garage, 536 U.S. at 442 (emphasis added).
108. Id. at 441; see also 49 U.S.C. § 31141 (a), (c)(4) (2000).
109. See infra Part 1V.B.
[Vol. 41
12
California Western Law Review, Vol. 41 [2004], No. 1, Art. 7
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol41/iss1/7
2004] CAL.'S REGULATION OF NON-CONSENSUAL PRIVATE PROPERTY Tows 315
IV. IS IT GENUINELY SAFETY OR IS IT AN UNREASONABLE
ECONOMIC BURDEN?
California Vehicle Code section 22658(l) restricts services of non-
consensual private property tows by demanding specific written au-
thorization and the presence of the property owner."' In contrast, the
FAAA section 14501(c) asserts that state laws are preempted in re-
gards to a tow company's "service, or route," unless it falls within a
safety exception."' In addition, the FAAA preempts state regulations
that unreasonably burden interstate commerce." 2 Thus, the issue of
preemption turns on whether California Vehicle Code section 22658()
is genuinely concerned with safety or whether it unreasonably burdens
interstate commerce. 113
A. California Vehicle Code Section 22658(l) is not a
Genuine Safety Regulation
California asserts that having one's vehicle unexpectedly and in-
voluntarily towed may put one's safety at risk. 114 Consequently, legis-
lation that prevents involuntary tows, helps to expedite the recovery of
a vehicle, or decreases tow mistakes promotes safety."5 In addition,
as expressed by the Court in Ours Garage, a safety regulation must be
genuine. 116 Under both definitions, however, section 22658(l) fails as
a safety regulation.
California claims that the "unexpected loss . . . of one's vehicle
directly affects the safety and welfare of vehicle operators and own-
ers" because a person may be "stranded hundreds of miles from home
with no alternative mode of return travel and with no place to stay un-
til the vehicle can be recovered.""' 7 Therefore, legislation promotes
110. CAL. VEH. CODE § 22658(1); Tillison Interview H, supra note 9.
111. 49 U.S.C. §§ 14501(c)(2)(A)-(C), (c)(3)(A) (2000); Ours Garage, 536 U.S. at 439.
In addition to safety, transportation of household goods, price charged for non-consensual tow
services, and rules of liability are reserved for states.
112. 49 U.S.C. §§ 31141(a), (c)(4)(C); see also Ours Garage, 536 U.S. at 441.
113. See supra Part H.
114. Berry v. Hannigan, 7 Cal. App. 4th 587, 591 (1992) (quoting Crane Towing, Inc. v.
Gorton, 570 P.2d 428, 434 (1977)). This rule was reiterated in People v. Servantes, 86 Cal.
App. 4th 1081, 1091 (2001).
115. Berry, 7 Cal. App. 4th at 591.
116. Ours Garage, 536 U.S. at 442. The court held that states and local municipalities
were exempt from preemption under the FAAA but left the issue of whether the contested
regulations were safety related open on remand. Id.
117. Berry, 7 Cal. App. 4th at 591 (quoting Crane Towing, 570 P.2d at 434).
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safety if it helps prevent involuntarily tows, expedites recovery,"' or
aids in preventing tow mistakes. 119 California Vehicle Code section
22658(l), however, does not legitimately promote any one of these
safety goals.
First, section 22658(l) does not help to prevent a vehicle from be-
ing involuntarily towed. Prevention occurs when notice is provided to
the vehicle owner that her actions may subject her vehicle to the pos-
sibility of being towed. Prevention is accomplished by strict compli-
ance to regulations, already in place, that mandate posted signs to
warn the vehicle owner of property rules prior to parking. 120 As sec-
tion 22658(l) stands, by the time an illegally parked vehicle is identi-
fied, a tow truck is called, proper written authorization is awarded, and
the owner or agent is overseeing the tow, the vehicle owner has long
since departed the scene and prevention is not possible. Unless, of
course, the assertion is that making the procedure more difficult and
time consuming gives the vehicle owner additional time to move the
illegally parked vehicle. 21 Although this might contribute to the pre-
vention of involuntary tows, it does so "in the same way that a law
mandating that airlines decrease their flight hours might lead to fewer
airplane crashes."' 22 In short, section 22658(l) does not aid in prevent-
ing involuntary tows. Instead, it provides a vehicle owner more lee-
way to avoid the consequences of their infraction.
Secondly, the requirements of section 22658(l) do not help to ex-
pedite recovery of the vehicle after it is lawfully towed. This factor
does not apply as it refers to procedures arising after a vehicle has
been towed, whereas section 22658(l) is implemented prior to a non-
consensual tow.
23
Finally, section 22658(l) is not necessary to help prevent tow mis-
takes. This argument presumes that tow truck operators and compa-
nies cannot comply with the law or wishes of the property owner
without an overseer. This is not necessary given provisions that regu-
118. Id.
119. Servantes, 86 Cal. App. 4th at 1090.
120. CAL. VEH. CODE § 22685(a)(1).
121. Excerpts of Record, Decision at 12, Tillison v. City of San Diego, DC No. CV-01-
02373-RMB (LSP) (S.D. Cal. 2003), appeal docketed, No. 03-55939 (9th Cir. Jan. 19, 2004).
122. Id.
123. This argument was raised in conjunction with whether tow companies were required
to except credit cards for private property non-consensual tows as payment for towing and
storage fees. Statutes that require tow companies to accept credit cards are exempt from fed-
eral preemption under the FAAA as a safety regulation. Indep. Towers of Wash. v. Wash.,
350 F.3d 925, 932 (2003).
(Vol. 41
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late fair business practices' 24 and the availability of substantial damage
awards for wrongfully towed vehicle owners.125 Moreover, the pre-
vention of tow mistakes can adequately be fostered by generalized
contractual relationships between tow companies and private property
owners. For example, contractual obligations not to tow when a vehi-
cle displays valid parking permits or meets other requirements to park
on the premises can be easily established. '2 6 Should the tower fail to
adhere to these contractual obligations, he would invariably harm his
reputation and lose his business relationships.1
27
In summary, California Vehicle Code section 22658(l) does not
prevent involuntary tows or expedite recovery and is not necessary to
help avoid tow mistakes. Therefore, the statute fails to meet Califor-
nia's own requirements as a safety regulation for non-consensual pri-
vate property tows.
In the wake of Ours Garage, which emphasized that state regula-
tions not genuinely concerned with safety would be federally pre-
empted,'28 the California Legislature enacted California Vehicle Code
section 22658(m)(2).129 This statute states that "the intent of the Leg-
islature in adopting [22658](1) [is] to further the safety of the general
public."'3 ° Two primary arguments were put forth in support of its
enactment.' First, it was asserted that requiring written authorization
for each tow was important because "allowing tow operators to make
such decisions . . . without having to consult with the property
owner ... can increase the chances that the tow will result in improper
tows, which can lead to violence.' 3 2 Second, it was maintained that
the provision "will assist the courts in any subsequent litigation on this
question."' 3 3 Notwithstanding the addition of section 22658(m)(2),
section 22658(l) is not magically changed into a safety regulation ex-
empt from federal preemption under the FAAA.
124. CAL. Bus. &PROF. CODE §§ 17200-2 10 (West 2004).
125. CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 22658(d), (e) (West 2004). Section (d) allows for the vehicle
owner to recover "any damage to the vehicle resulting from the intentional or negligent act of
any person causing the removal of, or removing, the vehicle." Id. Section (e) imposes liabil-
ity for double the fees on any person causing the removal of a vehicle not in compliance with
the numerous California Vehicle Codes. Id.
126. See Opening Brief of the Appellee, Addendum at 66-67, Tillison (No. 03-55939).
127. See id.
128. Ours Garage, 536 U.S. at 442.
129. Act of Aug. 11, 2003, A.B. No. 792, § 22658(m)(2), 2003 Cal. Legis. Serv. 212
(West).
130. CAL. VEH. CODE § 22658(m)(2).
131. See Assembly, supra note 40 and Senate, supra note 6.
132. Assembly, supra note 40.
133. Senate, supra note 6.
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To begin with, having a third party on the scene to authorize the
tow does not decrease the likelihood of a violent confrontation.' 14 As
asserted in Tillison, "[i]f the vehicle owner comes out, it doesn't mat-
ter if there [are] ten people there authorizing the vehicle to be towed.
If he wants to be confrontational, he's going to be confrontational."' 35
In Tillison, the City of San Diego attempted to support the proposition
that not having specific authorization on the scene increased the in-
stances of violence and resulted in more frequent calls for police ser-
vices. 136 However, the court refuted this claim and, using the City's
own statistics, pointed out that while section 22658(l) was enforced
the police were called for service to five local towing locations "7.29
[times] per week."' 13 7 After the court issued a Temporary Restraining
Order enjoining enforcement of 22658(l), the number of calls dropped
to "6.61 calls per week. ' 138 The court stated that the decrease in po-
lice calls "suggests that [s]ection 22658(l)," and the presence of wit-
nesses "does not significantly address a public safety concern."'
139
In fact, the requirement contravenes rather then promotes
safety." In opposition to the enactment of section 22658(m)(2) it was
argued that the "requirement acts to create dangerous situations ... all
of which are detrimental to public safety."'141  The North County
Apartment Managers Association asked the committee to consider the
situation of a drug dealer's illegally parked car in a resident's assigned
carport and inquired, "Do you really think it's necessary for a manager
to stand there to sign for the tow? ... Do you really think this will
stop an altercation?"'42 They further complained that they found it
"hard to believe that [the Legislature] would put the safety of the 'law
breaker' before the safety of [others]" by being more concerned with
preventing a drug dealer's illegally parked car from being towed over
the property manager's safety. 4 3 The court in Tillison contended that
134. See Opening Brief of the Appellee, Addendum at 62-63, Tillison v. City of
San Diego, Nos. 03-55939, 03-56188, 2004 WL 546060 (9th Cir. Feb. 6, 2004).
135. Id.
136. Excerpts of Record, Decision at 8, 10, Tillison v. City of San Diego, DC No. CV-01 -
02373-RMB (LSP) (SD. Cal. 2003), appeal docketed, No. 03-55939 (9th Cir. Jan. 19, 2004).
137. Excerpts of Record, Decision at 10, Tillison (No. 03-55939).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See Brief of Amicus Curiae North County Apartment Managers Association in Sup-
port of Appellee, Tillison v. City of San Diego, No. 03-55939, 2004 WL 1216520 (9th Cir.
Feb. 2, 2004).
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section 22658(l) actually "increases the time it takes to perform the
tow ... increas[ing] the chance that the vehicle operator will return to
the scene as the tow is taking place: a recipe for the very confronta-
tion" the statute claims to avoid."
Secondly, the Legislature's purposes for enacting 22658(m)(2) are
clearly not safety related. The central argument put forth was that the
statute "will assist the courts in any subsequent litigation on this ques-
tion."'45 Furthermore, 22658(m)(2) is meant to "enhance the position
and legal standing of the State of California."' 6 In short, its purpose
is to bolster the state's ability to regulate tow trucks. Certainly, when
Justice Ginsburg warned that "[1local regulation of prices, routes, or
services of tow trucks that is not genuinely responsive to safety con-
cerns garners no exemption from § 14501(c)(1)'s preemption rule,"'
147
she was referring to tactics by the state to cloak regulations like Cali-
fornia Vehicle Code section 22658(l) with false assertions of safety
like section 22658(m). Thus, even with the enactment of section
22658(m)(2), section 22658(l) is not a genuine safety regulation and is
preempted by the FAAA.
In conclusion, California Vehicle Code section 22658(l) fails to
meet the state's own standards and those of Ours Garage as a safety
regulation. Under this premise alone, section 22658(l) is preempted
under the FAAA section 14501(c).
B. California Vehicle Code Section 22658(l)
Unreasonably Burdens the Economy
In enacting the FAAA, Congress sought to deregulate the towing
industry, finding that "the regulation of intrastate transportation of
property 48 ... imposed an unreasonable burden on interstate com-
merce''149 and "impeded the free flow of [business]"' 50 In order to pro-
tect Congress' deregulatory purpose, section 31141 expressly provides
that the Secretary of Transportation may render a state law that has
144. Excerpts of Record, Decision at 11, Tillison (No. 03-55939).
145. Senate, supra note 6. This argument was reiterated throughout senate and assembly
meetings. Id. Whereas the argument that 22658(l) would prevent violent confrontations was
put forth only in the Assembly. Assembly, supra note 40.
146. Senate, supra note 6.
147. Ours Garage, 536 U.S. at 442 (emphasis added).
148. FAAA § 601(a)(1) (emphasis added).
149. Id. § 601(a)(1)(A).
150. Id. § 601(a)(1)(B). Congress found that regulation "impeded the free flow of trade,
traffic, and transportation of interstate commerce." Id.
17
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"no safety benefit... [or] would cause an unreasonable burden on in-
terstate commerce" unenforceable and preempted. 5' However, regu-
lations with only an indirect effect on motor carrier services do not un-
reasonably burden interstate commerce and these will be shielded
from preemption. 152 On the other hand, it is recognized that where a
statute exerts "acute, albeit indirect, economic effects,"' 53 and is found
to "frustrate[] the purpose of deregulation by acutely interfering with
the forces of competition,"1 54 it may impose an unreasonable burden
and be subject to federal preemption. '51
The California courts have yet to examine the economic implica-
tions of California Vehicle Code section 22658(l).156 However, a sta-
tistical analysis of the towing industry and California's impact on the
United States' economy reveals that California Vehicle Code section
22658(l) may be a regulation with such an acute, indirect effect on in-
terstate commerce. 1
57
California Vehicle Code section 22658(l) was enacted in 1991.58
In 1994 the FAAA sought to deregulate the towing industry.'59 How-
ever, California Vehicle Code section 22658(l) has been enforced
since its enactment to the present day despite deregulation of the in-
dustry.161 Thus, the impact of this statute may be discernable by a sta-
151. 49 U.S.C. §§ 31141(c)(4)(A), (C) (2000). The safeguarding purpose to protect eco-
nomic deregulation was affirmed by the Court in City of Columbus v. Ours Garage &
Wrecker Serv., Inc., 536 U.S. 424, 441 (2002).
152. Californian's For Safe and Competitive Dump Truck Transp. v. Mendoca, 152 F.3d
1184, 1189 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that the FAAA did not preempt California's Prevailing
Wage Law because it does not frustrate the deregulatory purpose).
153. N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514
U.S. 645, 668 (1995) (holding that New York's surcharges only indirectly affect insurance
policy prices and were not intended to be preempted under the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act).
154. Mendoca, 152 F.3d at 1189.
155. Id.; see also Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 514 U.S. at 668.
156. See supra Part IIID.
157. Of course it is difficult to ascertain how a single statute may affect the economy
overall, and there is virtually no guidance from the courts on how to determine whether a stat-
ute burdens interstate commerce. However, a generalized statistical analysis may provide a
glimpse of how section 22658(l) conflicts with the FAAA's deregulatory purpose.
158. Act of Oct. 14, 1998, S.B. No. 887, § 22658(/)(1), 1991 Cal. Legis. Serv. 1004
(West).
159. Foster, supra note 13; FAAA § 601(a)(2), Pub. L. No. 103-305, 108 Stat. 1569
(1994).
160. Although it is unclear if every city or municipality has continually enforced section
22658(l), it is clear that it was enforced in Santa Ana until 1999 and has remained enforced in
San Francisco and San Diego as evidenced by the ongoing case history. See Tocher v. City of
Santa Ana, 219 F.3d 1040 (1999); People v. Servantes, 86 Cal. App. 4th 1081, 1091 (2001);
Tillison v. City of San Diego, Nos. 03-55939, 03-56188, 2004 WL 546060 (9th Cir. Feb. 6,
2004).
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tistical analysis of California's motor vehicle towing industry during
the years of the statute's enforcement compared to the industry na-
tionwide. 
161
There are approximately 60,000 towing companies in the United
States and over 85% of their services include passenger vehicles and
light trucks, 162 the vehicles most commonly subject to private property
non-consensual tows. 63 According to the 1997 Economic Census,
motor vehicle towing accounted for $2.3 billion in revenues in the
United States."6 In short, towing services make up a large and profit-
able industry.
California's tow companies and operators have a huge impact on
interstate commerce. In 1997, California was the largest economic re-
gion contributing 23% to the United States' total revenues for motor
vehicle towing services. 65 The second largest contributing state was
Texas, which supplied less than 7% of total revenues."6 Thus, regula-
tions that restrict towing services in California, like section 22658(l),
are likely to have an acute, indirect affect on interstate commerce.
161. In 1997, the Census Bureau replaced the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) sys-
tem, used since the 1930s, with the North American Industries Classification System
(NAICS) to classify statistical information by industry sector. U.S. Census Bureau, Devel-
opment of NAICS, at http://www.census.gov/epcd/www/naicsdev.htm (last visited Mar. 10,
2004). These systems are used as standard classifications by the statistical agencies of the
United States. id. Motor Towing Services or "Motor Vehicle Towing" is referenced under
the SIC as 7549 and under the NAICS as 488410. U.S. Census Bureau, 1997 Economic Cen-
sus: NAICS 488410, Motor Vehicle Towing, at http://www.census.gov/epcd/ec97/industry/
E488410.htm#2002 (last visited Mar. 10, 2004) (on file with author)[hereinafter 1997 Eco-
nomic Census]. "Motor Vehicle Towing" is defined as "establishments primarily engaged in
towing light or heavy motor vehicles both local and long distance." U.S. Census Bureau,
488410 Motor Vehicle Towing, at http://www.census.gov/epcd/ec97/def/488410.txt (last vis-
ited Mar. 10, 2004) (on file with author). Unfortunately, statistics for 1987 (the prior census)
and previous years were based solely on the SIC, which do not separately calculate statistics
of Motor Vehicle Towing; rather, they report on the higher level industry sector, "Other
Automotive Services." See U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, 1987 CENSUS SERVICE INDUSTRIES,
GEOGRAPWC AREA SERIES, CALIFORNIA 10 (1989). Thus, it is impossible to analyze the in-
dustry prior to the enactment of California Vehicle Code section 22658(/) without making
very large and inaccurate assumptions.
162. Towing Recovery Association of America, Towing and Recovery Industry Overview,
at http://www.towserver.net/about%20traa.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2004) (on file with au-
thor).
163. Interview with Hilts, supra note 80.
164. 1997 Economic Census, supra note 161. Economic data from 1997 is the latest cen-
sus information available for motor vehicle towing. Economic data for 2002 for Motor Vehi-
cle Towing is expected to be available December 2004. U.S. Census Bureau, 2002 Economic
Census, Industry Series Reports, Transportation and Warehousing, at http://www.census.
gov/econ/census02/guide/ INDRPT48.HTM (last visited May 13, 2004) (on file with author).
165. 1997 Economic Census, supra note 161.
166. Id.
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More importantly, in 1992, California contributed $311 million in
revenues from motor vehicle towing services to the United States'
economy. 167 This accounted for 24.61% of total United States motor
vehicle towing industry revenues. 168 In 1997, California generated
$529 million in industry revenues. 169 However, this contribution made
up only 23.07% of total United States motor vehicle towing industry
revenues. 170 Simply, California's contribution to the United States
economy from 1992 to 1997 decreased by 1.54%.17 1 Had California
maintained its prior percentage of contribution and previous rates of
growth, it would have contributed $565 million instead of $529 mil-
lion. 72 In other words, regulations imposed in California that should
have been deregulated by the FAAA may be responsible for a loss of
revenue for interstate commerce of $36 million in this time period
alone.
In summary, while the nation's motor vehicle towing industry has
seen steady growth, in California, the nation's number one contribuor,
has not maintained prior contribution levels. Thus, arguments in op-
position to the enactment of California Vehicle Code section 22658(l)
may have been correct in declaring that "the requirement. .. frustrates
legitimate business goals."' 73  Furthermore, Congress' findings that
state regulation "of intrastate transportation of property 74 ... imposed
an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce"' 175 may have weight
in light of the continual enforcement of section 22658(l) and its sig-
nificant monetary consequences. The express purpose of the FAAA
section 14501(c) was to preempt regulations with such an acute, indi-
rect effect. Thus, section 22658(l) should be rendered unenforceable
and federally preempted as an unreasonable burden on interstate
commerce.
167. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, 1992 CENSUS OF SERVICE INDUSTRIES, GEOGRAPHIC AREA
SERIES, CALIFORNIA 12 (1994).
168. This percentage was determined from the total U.S. revenues in 1992, which was
$1.263 billion. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, 1992 CENSUS OF SERVICE INDUSTRIES, GEOGRAPHIC
AREA SERIES, UNITED STATES 10 (1994).
169. 1997 Economic Census, supra note 161.
170. Id.
171. This was determined by subtracting the 1997 percent contribution of 23.07% and the
1992 percentage contribution of 24.61%. See U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, supra note 167;
1997 Economic Census, supra note. 161.
172. This was determined by applying the 1992 percentage of 24.61% to the total revenues
of the United States of $2.3 billion. See U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, supra note 167; 1997 Eco-
nomic Census, supra note 161.
173. Senate, supra note 6.
174. FAAA § 601(a)(1), Pub. L. No. 103-305, 108 Stat.1569 (1994) (emphasis added).
175. Id. § 601(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
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C. California Vehicle Code Section 22658(l) is
Preempted by the FAAA
In short, California Vehicle Code section 22658(l) is preempted
by FAAA section 14501(c) on two grounds. First, it is not genuinely
responsive to safety concerns so it is granted no exception from pre-
emption. Second, it imposes an unreasonable burden on commerce by
exerting acute, although indirect, economic effects. Either argument
renders California Vehicle Code section 22658(l) federally preempted,
but given it is both unrelated to safety and an unreasonable economic
burden, the statute is unquestionably preempted by the FAAA section
14501(c).
V. CONCLUSION
The FAAA intended to deregulate the towing industry because
Congress found that state regulations imposed an unreasonable burden
on interstate commerce. Congress did not intend to preempt a state's
traditional safety regulation functions, however, a regulation must
genuinely relate to safety concerns. Moreover, the regulation may not
unreasonably burden interstate commerce. California Vehicle Code
section 22658(l) fails to meet either of these standards.
Section 22658(l), despite new assertions of the Legislature's in-
tent, does not promote the safety of the general public. In fact, safety
is compromised for managers and property owners in exchange for
promoting the convenience of a trespasser who ought to be towed for
her own illegal actions. The California courts should reaffirm previ-
ous findings by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and the District
Court for the Southern District of California that section 22658(l) is
not a genuine safety regulation. Courts holding otherwise are mis-
guided by their distaste for the towing industry, not the true applica-
tion or interpretation of the law.
Additionally, section 22658(l) may prove to unreasonably burden
interstate commerce. A statistical analysis of California's motor vehi-
cle towing industry shows that the enforcement of section 22658(l)
may have an acute effect on interstate commerce. Such regulations
frustrate the deregulatory purpose of the FAAA and should be ren-
dered unenforceable.
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'The fact that state regulation may affect interstate commerce
does not necessarily render it invalid; the United States Supreme
Court... never intended to cut the states off from legislating... [the]
safety of their citizens ... [b]ut a legislative body will not be allowed
" 176to abuse its . . . power simply by vague references to safety ... .
California Vehicle Code section 22658(l) is such a regulation and is
preempted under the FAAA.
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